讲座题目：Efficiency in Multiple-type Housing Markets多类型住房市场的效率

主讲人： 凤迪 瑞士洛桑大学商学院 博士候选人

讲座时间：4月20日 周四15:30

讲座地点：C366

线上：腾讯会议381-473-0039

讲座内容摘要：

We consider multiple-type housing markets (Moulin, 1995), which extend Shapley-Scarf housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) from one dimension to higher dimensions. In this model, Pareto efficiency is incompatible with individual rationality and strategy- proofness (Konishi et al., 2001). Therefore, we consider two weaker efficiency properties: coordinatewise efficiency and pairwise efficiency.

We show that these two properties both (i) are compatible with individual rationality and strategy-proofness, and (ii) help us to identify two specific mechanisms. To be more precise, on various domains of preference profiles, together with other well-studied properties (individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness), coordinatewise efficiency and pairwise efficiency respectively characterize two extensions of the top-trading- cycles mechanism (TTC): the coordinatewise top-trading-cycles mechanism (cTTC) and the bundle top-trading-cycles mechanism (bTTC).

Moreover, we propose several variations of our efficiency properties, and we find that each of them is either satisfied by cTTC or bTTC, or results in an impossibility result. Therefore, our characterizations can be interpreted as a compatibility test: any reasonable efficiency property that is not satisfied by cTTC or bTTC could be considered as incompatible with individual rationality and strategy-proofness.

For multiple-type housing markets with strict preferences, our characterization of bTTC constitutes the first characterization of an extension of the prominent TTC mechanism.

我们考虑多类型住房市场（Moulin，1995），它将Shapley-Scarf住房市场（Shapley and Scarf，1974）从一个维度扩展到更高维度。在这个模型中，帕累托效率与个人理性和抗策略不相容（Konishi等人，2001）。因此，我们考虑两个较弱的效率属性：coordinatewise efficiency和pairwise efficiency。我们表明，这两个属性都：(i)与个体理性和抗策略兼容，并且(ii)帮助我们确定两个具体的机制。更准确地说，在偏好的各个领域，连同其他已研究过的属性（个体理性、抗策略和非霸道），coordinatewise efficiency和pairwise efficiency分别表征了首位交易循环机制（TTC）的两个扩展：coordinatewise首位交易循环机制（cTTC）和bundle首位交易循环机制（bTTC）。此外，我们提出了几个效率属性的变体，我们发现每一个变体要么被cTTC或bTTC满足，要么导致一个不可能的结果。因此，我们的特征可以被解释为一种兼容性测试：任何合理的效率属性如果不被cTTC或bTTC所满足，就可以被认为与个人理性和抗策略不相容。对于具有严格偏好的多类型住房市场，我们对bTTC的描述构成了对重要的TTC机制的扩展的第一个描述。

主讲人个人信息:

凤迪，瑞士洛桑大学商学院博士候选人，瑞士自然科学基金资助研究员。目前从事个人选择理论，社会选择理论，机制设计，匹配理论，信息设计，以及博弈论在经济金融领域中的应用等科研工作。论文曾发表在International Journal of Economic Theory, IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, IEEE INFOCOM等国际杂志及会议。