题目：Securities Settlement Fails Network and Buy-in Strategies

　　报告人：何捷双，香港中文大学深圳分校，助理教授

　　时间：2019年6月6日(周四) 15:30～17:00

　　地点：经管院B131

　　报告摘要：

　　In the context of securities settlement, a trade is said to fail if on the settlement date either the seller does not deliver the securities or the buyer does not deliver funds. Settlement fails may have consequences for the parties directly involved and for the system as a whole. Chains of fails, for example, could lead to gridlock situations and large volume of fails can affect the liquidity and smooth functioning of financial markets. In this paper, we consider UK government bonds (gilts) and UK equities settlement data to examine the determinants of settlement fails and to explore the network characteristics of chains of settlement fails with the aim of identifying an optimal strategy to conduct a buy-in process that could resolve cascades of fails.

　　报告人简介：

　　何捷双2017年毕业于印第安纳大学，取得经济学博士学位，目前在香港中文大学(深圳)商学院担任助理教授，研究领域为金融网络、博弈论与微观经济理论，目前的工作集中在金融机构间网络形成，多层复杂网络间风险扩散，以及系统性风险。加入港中文(深圳)前，何捷双曾在英格兰银行从事研究工作，并于2011年、2009年分别从波士顿大学、999策略白菜手机论坛取得硕士与本科学位。