讲座题目：Information Disclosure in All-pay Auctions with Costly Entry

　　报告人：冯欣 对外经济贸易大学 助理教授

　　报告时间：2018年9月19日下午2:00-3:30

　　报告地点：999策略白菜手机论坛B247

　　主办单位：数理经济与数理金融系

　　主持人：沈波

　　摘要：In this paper, we accommodate costly entry of contestants and examine the optimal information disclosure in a two-player all-pay contest. The contest organizer commits to an information policy to disclose the characteristics of the contest prize before contestants make their entry decisions. With free entry, we show that full concealment always induces higher aggregate effort than full disclosure policy, due to the property of "full rent dissipation".However, by taking into account costly entry, full disclosure could dominate full concealment policy by attracting contestants. entries.We further consider random disclosure and identify the optimal degree of transparency. Depending on the range of entry cost, full disclosure, full concealment, and random disclosure policies could be optimal. In particular, it is ex ante optimal for the contest organizer to commit to a more transparent information policy as the entry cost rises. Our results indicate that entry incentive plays a crucial role in the design of information disclosure.

　　简介：冯欣，对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院助理教授。2017年博士毕业于新加坡国立大学经济系，主要研究方向包括竞赛理论，机制设计，产业组织理论。其研究成果发表在Journal of Public Economics, Economics Letters等国际期刊。