讲座题目：Multi-period Matching with Commitment

　　报告人：郑捷(助理教授，清华大学)

　　报告时间：2017年4月10日15:30—17:00

　　报告地点：经管院B127

　　主办单位：数理经济与数理金融系

　　摘要：Many multi-period matching markets exhibit some level of commitment. That is, agents’ ability to terminate an existing relationship may be restricted by cost of breakups, binding contracts or social norms. This paper models matching markets with three types of commitment, defines corresponding notions of stability and examines the existence of stable mechanisms, as well as specifies sufficient conditions for efficiency, strategy-proofness and other properties. Firstly, the market with full commitment most closely resembles the static matching market, where most of the results, such as existence of stability, hold in the most general class of preferences. However, there is no dynamically stable spot rule, which only depends on spot markets, unless agents are extremely impatient. Secondly, for the models with two-sided commitment or one-sided commitment, desirable properties that are valid under the setup with a fixed set of individuals may not hold when arrivals and departures are introduced, and three approaches are proposed to deal with this issue. Whenever a dynamically stable matching exists, we construct an algorithm building upon the Deferred Acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962) to characterize such a matching outcome. Moreover, as extensions, we discuss the case with no commitment and conduct welfare comparisons among cases with different types of commitment.

　　简介：郑捷，2005年毕业于清华大学，获得经济学学士和硕士学位，2011年毕业于华盛顿大学圣路易斯分校，获得经济学博士学位。现任职清华大学999策略白菜手机论坛。在American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings、Games and Economic Behavior、Nature Communications、Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization等国内外期刊发表论文十余篇。同时，他还是国际一流期刊Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization的副主编。